This paper aims to explore Matteo Ricci’s arguments for the existence of God in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven and analyse their philosophical origins. Traditionally, scholars have regarded Ricci’s theory of proving God’s existence as being deeply influenced by Thomas Aquinas, particularly his “Five Ways” of proving God’s existence. However, this study seeks to further demonstrate that Ricci’s arguments not only inherit Aquinas’ ideas but also integrate other philosophical traditions, particularly those from ancient philosophy (such as Cicero and Aristotle), while following the apologetic style of 16th-century Iberian missionaries (such as Luis de Granada, O.P.).
By comparing The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven with Summa Theologiae, Summa Contra Gentiles, and Introducción del Símbolo de la Fe, this paper attempts to illustrate that Ricci’s argumentative strategy exhibits a “syncretic” character. He adopts Aquinas’ “final cause” proof, draws on Cicero’s “commonsense” argument and the rhetorical structures of 16th-century missionary writings, adapting them to fit the Chinese cultural context. Furthermore, this paper explains why Ricci’s theory of God’s existence should not be regarded as a mere imitation of Aquinas’ ideas. Instead, it represents a unique argumentative model that blends multiple philosophical and theological traditions while adapting to the East Asian cultural milieu. This syncretic approach is reflected not only in textual structure and content selection but also in the adaptation and transformation of argumentation methods. It highlights both the diversity of Ricci’s philosophical sources and the historical specificity of his apologetic style.

This article explores the possibility and relevance of engaging Thomas Aquinas’s moral reflection in the Summa Theologica through a transcultural dialogue with Confucian thought to face contemporary crisis. It opens by examining the ongoing debate on whether Confucianism is best understood as a Virtue Ethics or a Role Ethics. Then it turns to Huang Yong’s work, which draws parallels between Aristotle, Aquinas, and Zhu Xi. Huang defends an interpretation of Confucianism as a form of Virtue Ethics, rooted in human nature and moral cultivation, and argues that Zhu Xi offers a model closer to the “ideal type” of Virtue Ethics than Aristotle. The interest of Zhu Xi’s reflection is indeed to put relational abilities and dispositions at the foundation of moral reflection. This is also what Li Yong establishes, although relying on Mencius and Aquinas.
Interestingly, all the thinkers mentioned share a fundamental trust in the phenomena of tradition. The commentarial practices of Neo-Confucianism and Scholasticism embody a hermeneutical ethics that enables intergenerational transmission and innovation in moral reflection. This can also be observed in Aquinas’s definition of virtue, examining both its transcultural and teleological foundations. In this sense, transcultural Virtue Ethics, built on the bridging of Scholasticism and Confucianism, as exemplified by several commentators, advocates for the pursuit of moral knowledge that integrates rational, emotional, and spiritual dimensions across philosophical traditions.

The question of “when does the human person begin to exist” is one of the most important issues in the Church’s teachings on bioethics. Aristotle first proposed the doctrine of delayed hominization, arguing that the embryo initially possesses a vegetative soul and a sensitive soul but, since its external limbs have not yet formed, it lacks a human form and, consequently, a human soul—that is, a rational soul. According to Aristotle, the male embryo attains full human existence after forty days, while the female embryo requires ninety days. Building on Aristotle’s embryology and philosophical framework, Thomas Aquinas shifted the focus of the question “when does a human being begin to exist” from the physical formation of the body to the moment of “the infusion of the soul.” He emphasized the instant when “God creates and infuses the soul into the human body,” thereby establishing the concept of “delayed ensoulment.” Influenced by this theological system, the Church’s initial stance on abortion applied only to “formed” embryos. Consequently, the stage from the zygote to the early embryo faced a crisis regarding which ethical and moral standards should be applied. In its document Donum Vitae: Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith suggests that “from the moment of conception, the human person is to be respected and treated as a person.” However, the phrase “treated as a person” implies that Church authorities have not fully resolved the dilemma of when ensoulment occurs, a dilemma arising from the “delayed process of adultization.” If we return to the Genesis account of how God created human being “in the beginning” and the Israelites’ understanding of the concept of human “existence,” might this help us move beyond the Greek philosophical notion of human being as a composite of body and soul? Could it allow us to define human existence in terms of the relationship between human being and God at the very beginning of His creation? At the same time, can the different perspectives on “human being” offered by Greek philosophical thought and Hebrew culture help in understanding and defining the “personhood” of human being?

Angels serve as intermediaries between humanity and God, yet the operation of angelic intellect and the nature of angelic knowledge have received insufficient scholarly attention. Because angels lack matter, angelic intellect acquires knowledge through internal intuition of itself, and angelic knowledge is characterized by its interiority, requiring no external input. Confronting the divine-human tension inherent in angelic intellect, Aquinas clarifies the identity of understanding and being in the perfection of intellect by positioning the specificational character of angelic intellect's operation and the intellect's "supernatural natural desire," thereby establishing an ontological boundary between the created and the uncreated. This intuitive and interior conception of intellect constitutes a distinctively characteristic epistemological framework within Thomism.

In biblical revelation, the Holy Trinity and Christ’s mode of existence primarily are characterized by continuous outgoing movement, self-emptying (kenosis), or decentralization. This dynamic forms the foundation of the Church’s missionary outreach. The Church’s very nature should manifest and historically continue the mode of existence of the Trinity and Christ. Yet, this is often not the case. Even today, forms that are inconsistent with or opposed to this nature persist within the Church, such as self-centeredness. This attitude severely hinders the Church’s self-realization in her mission of evangelization. Therefore, the Church needs to be reformed. Following the path of Vatican II, Pope Francis proposes synodality as the direction and solution for this reform. This article primarily explores how synodality, on the one hand, renews our understanding of the Church by integrating what the Church is with what the Church does, and on the other hand, concretely enables the Church to more closely resemble the decentralized nature of the Holy Trinity and Christ—that is, to realize its essential missional existence.

In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature examining the concept of “union with Christ” in Pauline texts, offering various proposals and interpretations aimed at providing a coherent explanation of this concept within Paul's epistles. This article critically evaluates three recent works that attempt to explicate Paul’s notion of “participation in Christ”: Blackwell's Christosis, Gorman’s Inhabiting the Cruciform God, and Macaskill’s Union with Christ in the New Testament. The evaluation is conducted based on the following criteria: theosis, the definition of participation in Christ, the distinction between Creator and creation, and the thematic centrality of participation in Christ within Paul’s thought. Finally, this study explores whether the theme of participation in Christ occupies a central position in Pauline theology and suggests potential avenues for further research, particularly regarding the relationship between sacraments, rituals, and the theme of participation in Christ.

This essay describes and analyzes the passages where Rev. Li Ande (1693–1774) in his Journal mentions the French MEP missionary and Bible translator Jean Basset (1662–1707). It was Fr. Basset who had taken the young Li Ande from his home in Shenxi to Sichuan and started the education of the boy. More than fourty years after Basset’s death, Rev. Li Ande wrote in his Journal about Fr. Basset and his works, altogether mentioning him around 30 times. The present study analyzes the Latin appellations by which Li Ande respectfully names his mentor Basset, the impact of Basset’s short catechism, Basset’s role in the social acceptance of Catholicism in Sichuan, and his Chinese translation of the New Testament. Finally, Basset’s polite attitude also was praised by Li Ande. The essay highlights the missionary heritage of Fr. Basset as it was described, evaluated, and continued by Li Ande.

This article aims to challenge the long-standing scholarly accusations of Simone Weil’s alleged Gnostic tendencies, arguing that her thought rigorously rejects any form of ontological dualism or epistemological dichotomy, and contending to position her within the continuum of Christian thought, particularly the Catholic tradition. In the second part of the argument, I present Weil’s hermeneutical reconstruction of spiritual history and argue that her advocacy of intellectual individualism does not originate from a cryptic Gnostic perspective but rather represents an attempt to reinterpret Christ’s love in response to the profound challenges of her time. This reinterpretation may be imperfect yet possessing sincerity.